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Law School, Debt,
and Discrimination
Jonathan D. Glater

I. Introduction
Law school is more than a professional training ground.1 Our graduates
play a special and privileged role in the nation’s politics and culture. They
know—or should know—the language of the law, the vehicle broadly capable
of moving society from where it is to where it aspires to be, and ideally aimed
at achieving justice in the case of individuals wronged by the state, a neighbor,
or simple bad luck. This special role for lawyers adds significance to questions
of who goes to law school and what law students do after they graduate.
Law graduates’ career decisions have practical effects on access to justice; for
example, new lawyers may choose to serve, or not to serve, poor, historically
subordinated communities.
Decisions about careers also link access to justice to student financing of
law school. The more law students must borrow to pay for their education,
the more pressure they are under to pursue higher-paying jobs to manage
repayment. While empirical evidence of the impact of indebtedness on
decision-making is scarce, the data we do have suggests that more borrowing
for law school correlates with a lower likelihood of seeking a career devoted
to the public interest.2 The correlation makes sense, because public interest
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1.

See, e.g., Susan Sturm, Reaction: Law Schools, Leadership, and Change, 127 Harv. L. Rev. F. 49 (2013)
(describing the special role that law schools, through the lawyers they train, play in society);
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332 (2003) (observing that “universities, and in particular,
law schools, represent the training ground for a large number of our Nation’s leaders”).

2.

Erica Field, Educational Debt Burden and Career Choice: Evidence from a Financial Aid Experiment at
NYU Law School, 1 Am. Econ. J.: Applied Econ. 1, 15 (2009) (finding that law students are
more likely to pursue public interest jobs after receiving grant aid than after receiving an
economically equivalent combination of debt and loan forgiveness).
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careers tend to pay less.3 The more students must pay for law school, the more
likely it is that they will seek more lucrative careers.
Lenders have incentives, too. All else equal, a loan to a law student on
track to land a well-paid job at an elite law firm is a lower risk than one to a
student who finds work elsewhere. If possible, rational lenders would charge
different interest rates to borrowers depending on how risky they are—or at
least how risky they appear. Varying terms of credit would reinforce incentives
facing student borrowers, encouraging those with greater debt to pursue
better-compensated jobs. Preventing such added pressure is one reason that
federal loan programs charge students a fixed rate regardless of borrower
characteristics.4 In contrast, consumer lenders historically have more closely
tied the cost of funds to the riskiness of borrowers. They have also engaged in
prohibited discrimination, systematically charging higher rates to borrowers
who are African American, for example.5 Greater involvement of commercial
lenders in higher education finance thus raises the risk that student borrowers
will face traditional forms of discrimination, as well as more sophisticated
forms using borrower characteristics that correlate with attributes rendered
off-limits by law.
Two potential policy shifts in higher education finance, both of which may
make law school more costly for students and more profitable for lenders, make
the issue of lender discrimination more pressing. First, opponents of federal
subsidization of access to higher education have laid the rhetorical foundation
for arguments that the government’s role should be limited, reduced, or
eliminated.6 For example, Congress could impose a limit on the total amount
that students may borrow from the federal government, forcing students to
rely on consumer loans for additional amounts. Congress could mandate a
return to the guaranteed loan program that existed before the financial crisis
that began in 2008, in which the government both paid commercial lenders
to extend loans to students and at the same time guaranteed those loans,
protecting lenders in the event of student default. And Congress could end
federal lending programs entirely, although the political costs of such a move
would likely be catastrophically high. The common effect of these policy
moves is to push borrowers to commercial lenders, who generally offer less
3.

Field, supra note 2, at 2 (noting increasing divergence between public service and privatesector wages to lawyers).

4.

Jonathan D. Glater, Student Debt and Higher Education Risk, 103 Cal. L. Rev. 1561, 1564 (2015)
(setting terms of eligibility for student loans by statute).

5.

See, e.g., Press Release 12-8869, Dept. Justice, Justice Department Reaches Settlement with
Wells Fargo Resulting in More Than $175 Million in Relief for Homeowners to Resolve Fair
Lending Claims (July 12, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-reachessettlement-wells-fargo-resulting-more-175-million-relief [https://perma.cc/C4LP-QSAP].

6.

See, e.g., Michael Stratford, With GOP in Control, Private Sector Pushes for Increased Role in Student
Loans, PoliticoPro (Dec. 9, 2016) (quoting bank trade group representative expressing
desire for greater private sector financial institution involvement in federal student lending)
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favorable terms than federal programs, and who charge interest at variable
rates.7
Second, as of this writing the Trump administration has proposed ending
the Public Service Loan Forgiveness program (“PSLF”), which, as its name
suggests, allows for forgiveness of student loan debts owed by graduates who
pursue careers in the public interest.8 The Trump administration criticized this
benefit because it “unfairly” favored some career choices over others.9 If PSLF
is eliminated, some number of students will make different career choices in
anticipation of a heavier repayment burden.10 More borrowing increases the
riskiness of investing in higher education of any sort, including law school.11
Students who are more risk averse, who may be disproportionately students
whose life experiences have already shown them the burdens of financial
insecurity, will respond to this risk shift.12 Because more students than ever
must borrow to pay for law school, 13 the impact could be significant.14
7.

Jonathan D. Glater, Guide to Student Loans, N.Y. Times (Nov. 30, 2007), https://archive.
nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/ref/timestopics/topics_studentloans.html [https://perma.
cc/LWX7-GV9F]. Another possible outcome is greater use of so-called “income share
agreements” (“ISAs”), under which investors provide money to a student to help cover
the cost of higher education in exchange for a share of the student’s income for a period
of years. These relatively novel contracts have not been the subject of extensive litigation
or legislation, so it is not clear whether they would be treated as loans. Dowse B. (Brad)
Rustin IV, Neil E. Grayson, and Kiersty M. DeGroote, Am. Enterprise Inst. Ctr on
Higher Educ. Reform, Pricing Without Discrimination: Alternative Student Loan
Pricing, Income-Share Agreements, and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 12 (Feb.
2017), https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Pricing-Without-Discrimination.
pdf (hereinafter “Pricing without Discrimination”). This essay will not address the specific
issues presented by ISAs.

8.

34 C.F.R. § 685.219 (2018).

9.

Jonathan D. Glater, Public Service Loan Forgiveness in the Administration’s Crosshairs, Educ. Law
Prof Blog (May 24, 2017), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/education_law/2017/05/
public-service-loan-forgiveness-in-the-administrations-crosshairs-by-jonathan-d-glater.html
[https://perma.cc/67CE-U3G9].

10.

Students may already have been deterred given the widely reported difficulty borrowers
have experienced when trying to take advantage of loan forgiveness after working in jobs
they believed qualified for the benefit. Ron Lieber, The Public Service Loan Forgiveness Rescue
Hasn’t Gone Well So Far, N.Y. Times (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/17/
your-money/public-service-loan-forgiveness.html.

11.

Glater, Student Debt and Higher Education Risk, supra note 4, at 1581 (noting that leverage in the
context of higher education finance worsens the borrower’s downside risk).

12.

Id.

13.

The share of law students who anticipate borrowing to pay for their legal education has
increased, and a larger share of the students who expect to borrow, also expect to borrow
larger amounts. Law School Survey of Student Engagement, How a Decade of Debt
Changed the Law Student Experience: 2015 Annual Survey Results 10, http://lssse.
indiana.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/LSSSE-Annual-Report-2015-Update-FINALrevised-web.pdf.

14.

Both in absolute and relative terms. Elsewhere I have noted the risk that reducing public
support of student decisions to work in the public interest will disproportionately deter
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This essay focuses on the first policy move, which would push more law
students to borrow from banks or other consumer lenders and accordingly pay
interest rates that vary over time and, potentially, with borrower characteristics.
Part II provides an analysis of the effects of variable pricing of student loans,
especially for law students, and identifies the undesirable consequences; this
part extends the analysis of a longer, prior paper critical of so-called “riskbased” pricing of student loans. Part III presents and attempts to answer the
question of what current laws may limit lenders’ pricing15 of education loans
in particular and then steps back to examine how those laws might also limit
setting terms of other kinds of credit based on criteria related to education,
such as choice of major or institution attended. The concern animating this
discussion is that lender practices may have a disparate and negative effect
on borrowers who are members of groups historically excluded from higher
education opportunity. The analysis in Part III covers not only laws that may
be applicable but the contributions of critical race theorists to understanding
of the effects of judicial interpretation of those laws. Part IV examines potential
implications for law schools and their students of wider use of nontraditional
criteria in credit decisions. Part V concludes.
II. Changing rates, changing fates
Varying the price of credit for borrowers serves multiple purposes. First,
the practice enables the lender to protect its interests more effectively, because
variable pricing can compensate the lender for making a loan to a higher-risk
borrower. Second, variable rates can encourage potential borrowers who are
attentive to interest rates to change their behavior to improve their risk profile
and reap the resulting benefit of the lower cost of credit. However, in the
context of higher education in general and law school in particular, lending
governed by market principles will likely have a number of undesirable effects.
This part briefly identifies these effects, then turns to the implications for
access to justice, and finally examines potential consequences for law schools.
A. The Risks of Variable Pricing of Student Loans
Adjusting the price of credit based on borrower characteristics is a common
practice in consumer lending. This section shows why education is different
and argues that adjusting the cost of credit based on perceived risk posed
by the student borrower is unjustified, ineffective, unfair, and inconsistent
with legislative ideals that drove the federal intervention in higher education
finance.16
poorer students from those careers, thus potentially changing the composition of the public
interest workforce, but more importantly limiting the field of possibilities for students based
on their financial resources. Those who must borrow more will have fewer choices than those
who borrow less.
15.

To be clear, the “pricing” of student loans here is the interest rate charged to the borrower.

16.

A broader argument, that those pursuing higher education should not be burdened by debt
as they start their working lives, is also possible. That subject has been addressed in a prior
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This section first describes the typical justifications for tying price to
characteristics or conduct and demonstrates why in the context of higher
education finance those rationales are dubious. The second subsection
questions whether students faced with different costs of credit would modify
their behavior in response—whether, in other words, variable pricing of
student loans could successfully achieve a policy goal. The third traces the
undesirable effects of variable pricing of student loans, whether students
modify their behavior or not. The fourth identifies the bad incentives that
variable pricing of student loans creates, and the last subsection contends that
adopting variable pricing would be inconsistent with the goals underlying
federal legislation that established federal student aid programs.
1. Typical rationales for pricing credit based on risk do not apply.
To the extent that charging different interest rates to different kinds of
borrowers represents a deliberate policy choice, the proper place to begin
analysis is by asking what the goals are. In the context of consumer lending
generally, higher interest rates compensate the lender for the greater level of
risk that a particular borrower may pose. If the borrower is more likely to
default because of either the characteristics of the borrower or characteristics
of the use to which the loan will be put, the lender demands a larger premium.
For example, a borrower who has previously defaulted on obligations may
appear more risky to a new lender, as might a borrower who plans to put the
loan proceeds to work in starting a dubious business like landline telephony.
Were the lender unable to charge a higher rate to the riskier borrower, the
lender might well decline to extend credit at all.
This variable, or “risk-based,” pricing may consist of calculating a borrower’s
cost of credit as a premium above some benchmark rate. Setting interest
rates in this way creates incentives for borrowers whose choices, rather than
personal histories, can be changed. A lender may effectively steer a borrower
toward a business venture that the lender believes to be less rather than more
risky. Granting lenders this power to discriminate can be justified by faith in
the wisdom of the lender and in the ability of credit markets more generally
to evaluate projects. If the lender’s estimate of the net benefit to the lender
of funding each of two possible projects is correct, then there are advantages
to permitting lenders to charge borrowers more if they pursue one project
than if they pursue another. If the lender is wrong—which could result either
from wrongly estimating the profitability of the loan to the lender or, from the
societal perspective, from excluding from its calculation the social benefits of
the project—then the mispriced credit means that a socially desirable project
may not proceed.
article and will not be pursued here. Glater, Student Debt and Higher Education Risk, supra note 4,
at 1584 (contrasting risk of leverage taken on to pursue higher education and debt for other
purposes).
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Using price differentials to affect behavior is not uncommon. Health
insurers, for example, may charge higher premiums to people who smoke.
The higher payment both compensates the insurer for the greater risk of costly
health care for the smoker and encourages smokers to quit. The premium
either leads to a desirable change or penalizes the person who resists making
the change. Charging different prices for different consumers thus serves two
purposes at once: compensating lenders for greater risk and disincentivizing
socially costly or undesirable conduct. Whether it achieves these two goals,
by ensuring appropriate but not excessive or inadequate compensation to the
lender for risk and by effectively changing consumer behavior, is a different
question.
In the context of higher education finance, the premium for risk rationale
does not apply particularly well. Once upon a time, lenders had good reason
to charge higher interest rates to student borrowers who were more likely
to default, because those borrowers offered no collateral and lenders had
no insurance regime. But today the federal government provides the most
common type of student loan, which is guaranteed, ultimately by taxpayers.
All student lenders, including those making “private” student loans that may
carry variable rates, also enjoy the benefit of exceptional protection against
nonpayment under the federal Bankruptcy Code.17 Correspondingly, it is less
clear that risk to the lender justifies varying interest rates based on student
choices or characteristics.
The argument otherwise percolating in policymaking circles does not rest on
lender protection but on borrower incentives.18 If borrowers face different costs
of credit depending on their education choices, they can be guided to those
that are socially optimal. A higher interest rate might discourage borrowers
from attending a school with a poor graduation rate or high student loan
default rate. Higher rates could also deter borrowers from choosing majors
in subjects associated with higher default rates or lower wages. Conversely,
students attending an institution with a high graduation rate and low default
rate might obtain credit at a lower cost. Again, if the lender skillfully sets
interest rates in accord with the relative usefulness of student choices, then
variable interest rates should produce more frequent selection of desirable
options.
However, in the context of education, good reasons exist to worry about
adoption of market-based assessment of student choices, as I have detailed
17.

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2019) (permitting discharge of student loans in bankruptcy
proceedings only upon showing by the borrower of “undue hardship”). Scholarship on the
impact of this exceptional treatment of student debt has found that the law is inconsistently
applied, though it is widely perceived as making discharge extremely difficult. Rafael I.
Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, The Real Student Loan Scandal: Undue Hardship Discharge Litigation, 83
Am. Bkrtcy. L. J. 179, 183-84 (2009).

18.

See, e.g., Michael Simkovic, Risk-Based Student Loans, 70 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 527 (2013)
(arguing for varying interest rates based on, for example, college students’ choice of major).
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elsewhere.19 The focus on financial outcomes excludes consideration of other
aspects of education, including the potential public benefit of pursuing careers
such as teaching, which are less well-paid but nevertheless highly valued, and
the intangible value to the student of pursuing one’s passion. More concretely,
overall assessments of the economic viability of student choices may miss the
economic viability of any particular student’s choices. Perhaps we do not need
large numbers of students to devote themselves to study of epic poetry, but
we also should not want to discourage the one student who might go on to
write a Pulitzer-winning epic. Factors other than choice of major or choice of
educational institution play a role in determining whether any student will be
successful by any metric, financial or otherwise.
To vary interest rates based on additional characteristics might get us closer
to properly aligning students with institution and course of study, but it might
open the door to discriminatory pricing of credit in education and would
position lenders to make judgments well outside their experience or expertise.
For example, we certainly want vigorous enforcement of prohibitions against
varying credit terms on the basis of race and sex, even if data suggests that
financial success in a particular field correlates with such identity-based
characteristics. Consider further that even if unlawful consideration of race or
gender does not infect the extension of credit, a lender might still need to wade
into assessing the quality of the writing of that student studying classical epic
poetry to make an educated guess about how successful that student would
be. The difficulty of the latter task might well increase the likelihood of resort
to insidious proxies for prohibited characteristics, like race or sex.
The legislative bulwark against discrimination is the subject of Part III.
This part next turns to a more pragmatic question: Does variable pricing of
student loans work?
2. Variable pricing of student loans is unlikely
to change borrower behavior.
Students may pay little attention to interest rates, in part because they are
unaccustomed to having options and evaluating the terms of credit, in part
because they may believe that whatever loans cost, higher education is worth
the burden, and in part because they simply tend not to pay attention to such
complex financial commitments. This should not surprise: If students were
entirely swayed by monetary signals of social value, they would respond to
the wages associated with particular careers and pursue educational pathways
that lead to the jobs that pay the most. Some do and many do not. Studies
of the effects of terms of credit on borrower behavior are not conclusive, and
probably for good reasons. Not every borrower is equally able to evaluate
such terms. This and other potential barriers to efficacy of interest rates as
19.

See generally Jonathan D. Glater, The Unsupportable Cost of Variable Pricing of Student Loans, 70 Wash.
& Lee L. Rev. 2137 (2013) (arguing against pricing of student loans based on borrower
choices or characteristics).
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an incentive were explored in more detail in a prior project, but in the years
since the publication of that article, compelling empirical research that took
advantage of a natural experiment has offered additional evidence.
Xiaoling Ang and Alexei Alexandrov used a policy change, the reduction in
price of one type of federal student loan at a subset of educational institutions,
to study whether borrowers responded by replacing other education loans
with the newly cheaper loan.20 Their research found that borrowers did not do
the rational thing and substitute the less expensive loans for more expensive
ones.21 At one level, the authors note, this is not surprising, because a change
of sixty basis points—0.6%—is modest, and they suggest that perhaps a larger
change in interest rates would have had an effect.22 This speculation suggests
a risk that sending a signal through interest rates poses: Too great a difference
may discourage pursuit of higher education entirely for those confronting the
higher rate. The authors conclude that while other forms of intervention in
education finance, like providing students with more information, may be
effective, “policies based on free-market theories and consumer choice should
be evaluated very carefully in this particular market.”23
Though using interest rates to drive student borrowers’ choices may fail to
have the intended effect, it is likely to have consequences. Students who are
undeterred by the higher costs of credit associated with a particular choice of
major, for example, will ipso facto carry a higher debt burden and, presuming the
student’s choice also correlates with likelihood of lower earnings, may well be
more likely to run into repayment difficulty than under the current regime. In
other words, a mechanism intended to reduce default rates by steering students
toward greater financial security may have the perverse result of driving default
rates up as borrowers ignore the message that higher rates send. Predictions
of a higher probability of default associated with particular courses of study
would become self-fulfilling.24 Worse still, although changing the cost of credit
may not affect student behavior overall, it is quite plausible that some students
are more responsive to such signals while others are less so. Raising interest
rates may discourage students who belong to particular, historically excluded
groups that are more averse to debt, from pursuing certain courses of study.25
To the extent that federal student loans are intended to make higher education
20.

Xiaoling Ang & Alexei Alexandrov, Choice Architecture Versus Price: Comparing the Effects of Changes
in the U.S. Student Loan Market, 14 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 762, 763-64 (2017); see also Alexei
Alexandrov & Dalié Jiménez, Lessons from Bankruptcy Reform in the Private Student Loan Market, 11
Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 175, 178 (2011) (finding, among other things, that the price elasticity
of demand for student loans was “not significantly different from zero”).

21.

Ang & Alexandrov, supra note 20, at 766.

22.

Id.

23.

Id. at 768.

24.

Glater, Unsupportable Cost, supra note 19, at 2147.

25.

Glater, Student Debt and Higher Education Risk, supra note 4, at 1590.
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more—and equally—accessible to all kinds of students, variable pricing might
well be counterproductive.
If the signaling effect of a higher or lower interest rate were to succeed, that
result would be disturbing even if the impact did not vary across the student
population: Only students who needed to borrow would be subject to having
their studies, careers, and lives shaped by the policy. Those students with
greater financial resources could continue to study whatever they wanted, seek
whatever jobs they wanted, and live free of the obligation to repay student
debt. Students of color disproportionately have fewer financial resources and
borrow more, so they would correspondingly be disproportionately affected.
Overall, because varying of interest rates by choice of major, for example,
would be only selectively paternalistic, the policy would be regressive,
reinforcing the preexisting distribution of wealth.26 The next subsection
develops this criticism more fully.
Even this built-in inequity might not be dispositive were the ability to direct
students to the most socially desirable careers perfect. But there is no reason
to believe that whatever entity sets interest rates for loans to students pursuing
different courses of study or different careers would get it right. Predicting the
jobs of tomorrow is objectively, positively difficult in our ever more quickly
evolving economy; deciding which of those future jobs, many of which may
not exist, are most valuable is objectively, normatively difficult in our ever
more fractious political and cultural climate. Relative to the value of students’
ability to choose their own paths to self-fulfillment, one component of which
may well be contributing to their community, the effort to steer young people’s
choices is especially misguided, as well as subject to manipulation to serve
other purposes—a point to which the essay returns in Part III.
3. Variable pricing of student loans is regressive.
Only students who depend on credit to pay for higher education are
subject to any incentive created by terms on which that credit is extended.
Accordingly, the attempt to steer student choices through interest rates
must have a regressive effect. This is inherent in the policy tool in use, yet it
is too often ignored, perhaps because the point is so glaringly obvious. But
if variable pricing of student loans truly aims to direct students into more
desirable courses of study and ultimately professional development, it is quite
underinclusive: Students who do not borrow will be immune to the incentive
effect. From the perspective of efficacy alone, this is no small defect, because
even though student indebtedness quite rightly dominates national debate
over accessibility of higher education, most college students still do not use
federal loans to help pay the cost.27
26.

Glater, Unsupportable Cost, supra note 19, at 2156.

27.

College Board, Trends in Student Aid 2017, at 17 (2017) (fig. 9), https://trends.
collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/2017-trends-student-aid_0.pdf. According to the
College Board, in 2016-2017, thirty percent of undergraduate students took out federal
Stafford loans or used parental PLUS loans to help pay for college. Id. Of course, these
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But efficacy is, or should be, the lesser concern. Equity is the greater one.
In a higher education finance regime that discourages student choice by
raising the cost of debt for those of lesser means, students who are better
off financially will enjoy opportunities unavailable to their classmates. This
would constitute hostile paternalism, marking students who are already
socioeconomically disadvantaged as less worthy of freedom of choice. And if
poorer students ignore the incentives and pursue their desired courses of study
and employment despite the higher cost of borrowing, they will be penalized
by higher monthly payments after they graduate or drop out. Indeed, poorer
student borrowers may be more likely to drop out and more likely to default on
their repayment obligations as a result of the larger debt burdens that they will
have. To the extent that predictions about future earning power prove correct,
students who defy the interest rate incentive and end up in lower-paying jobs
will be that much more heavily burdened. Variable pricing of student loans
thus perpetuates and perhaps exacerbates28 preexisting inequality across the
population of potential college students.
Over time, if variable pricing of students loans were to have the intended
effect,29 students who depend on credit to pay for higher education would
end up studying whatever the interest rates encouraged them to study and
pursuing related careers. Students who do not need to borrow, or at least
do not need to borrow using federal aid programs, would pursue whatever
courses of study they liked and would begin their careers unburdened by debt,
let alone by repayment obligations made higher because of the choices they
made. Students who do need to borrow would be directed into those jobs
deemed important by whatever entity or mechanism determined interest rates.
This tracking phenomenon would ensure greater autonomy for students with
greater wealth or family income and less for those with less. Even if poorer
students enjoy higher earnings as a result of responding to an interest rate
nudge, they may be discouraged from and punished for pursuing careers they
actually wish to enter. Variable pricing thus perpetuates wider inequality, a
problem that higher education alone cannot fix but one that policy should not
exacerbate. This runs very precisely counter to the vision of higher education
as a socioeconomic equalizer empowering students to make independent
figures can vary from year to year.
28.

This is so because students who borrow are less likely to complete a given course of study.
Dai Li, Degree Attainment of Undergraduate Student Borrowers in Four-Year Institutions: A Multilevel
Analysis, 37 J. Student Fin. Aid 5, 11 (2008), https://publications.nasfaa.org/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1045&context=jsfa. And upon dropping out, indebted students may be materially
worse off than they were when they started their higher education because they may fail to
obtain higher-paying employment associated with graduation and because they have the
obligation to repay their student loans.

29.

Which, to be clear, is not likely. If higher wages do not drive student decision-making, it is
hard to see how interest rate changes would. See supra Part II.A.2.
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choices about their lives, the vision that lawmakers acted upon in approving
the Higher Education Act30 (the “HEA”) nearly sixty years ago.31
Both the need for credit to pay for higher education and susceptibility to
the incentive created by variable interest rates almost certainly are unevenly
distributed across the student population. African American and Latinx
students are disproportionately poor and so would be disproportionately
affected by such a policy, either steered into particular courses of study and onto
particular career paths or penalized for choosing disfavored courses of study
and disfavored career paths. And students from historically disadvantaged
racial and ethnic backgrounds may be consistently more likely to respond
to variable interest rates, which could exacerbate disproportionality either in
career choice or, worse, likelihood of default.32
4. Variable pricing creates undesirable incentives.
Variable pricing of student loans would reduce student autonomy by
placing constraints on student choice. But supporters of such constraints will
see the paternalism lurking within incentives as a desirable feature rather than
a bug. Student autonomy is not referenced in the HEA, for example, although
it is implicit in earlier discussions in Congress about predecessor legislation,
when lawmakers debated whether specific fields of study should receive special
treatment to encourage students to learn more about those areas and topics
relevant to national defense.33 Congress did not opt for such a heavy hand.34
But a price signal intended to influence student decisions would have
pernicious effects well beyond burdening autonomy. First, the signal may be
misguided, because the setting of terms of credit would reflect past trends.
Were the federal government to implement variable pricing to steer student
borrowers to high-income careers, the effort might fail because tomorrow’s
best-paying jobs will not be those of yesterday. Some of the most lucrative jobs
of today did not exist in the past. There is a nontrivial risk that students who
respond to price signals will find themselves ready for lucrative employment
in an industry that is in decline or even has ceased to exist.35 Coupled with
the potential disparate impact of selectively higher interest rates on students
historically excluded from higher education opportunity, this could mean that
these students would consistently lag behind employment trends; variable
30.

Public Law No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (1965).

31.

See infra Part II.A.5.

32.

There is evidence that students of different backgrounds are more or less averse to borrowing,
suggesting the possibility of varying degrees of sensitivity (price elasticity) to interest rate
changes. Glater, Unsupportable Cost, supra note 19, at 2176.

33.

Glater, Unsupportable Cost, supra note 19, at 2169.

34.

Id. In prior work I argued that education enables students to pursue their own life choices
and federal policy should not constrain them; I will not rehash those arguments here. Id. at
2177-78.

35.

Id. at 2149.
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pricing could thus exacerbate rather than ameliorate gaps between employer
needs and graduates’ skills.
Complicating any effort to direct student choices is the likelihood that
in the current economy, fewer and fewer employees remain with a single
employer, or even in the same industry, for an entire career. Students who
respond to price signals in choosing what to study and where to work may
move around. Law school graduates in particular may move around given the
structure of practice: In their early years, lawyers gain experience working in
organizations that can provide training. As they learn and develop their skills,
they become more valuable to a wider range of employers that might not have
been willing to invest in training but would happily poach the now-ready
lawyer. At different times in their lives, lawyers may move around to pursue
more or less lucrative or more or less meaningful employment.36 And lawyers
move into and out of government service. A lawyer’s career can be long and its
twists and turns quite unpredictable.
Three more adverse effects have special significance for law schools. First,
the variable pricing of student loans could well penalize undergraduate majors
that do not lead immediately to high-paying jobs but do lead to enrollment
in law school. Law students, according to a recent study of the financial value
of a law degree, disproportionately have chosen undergraduate majors in, for
example, “humanities and social sciences and are less likely to have majored
in STEM37 or business and economics.”38 If these students are paying higher
interest rates on their loans because of their choice of major, then the policy of
imposing variable rates will disproportionately burden law school graduates.39
Second, this problem is exacerbated because law students, like graduate
and professional school students more generally, graduate with larger debts.40
Law school, like medical school and business school, is expensive. Charging
higher interest rates to law students, who default on their loans at a lower
rate than do undergraduates,41 might have the controversial effect of making
36.

Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that law school graduates who may enter private
practice to pay off their loans may then pursue less well-compensated careers in public
service. See Field, supra note 2 (finding that law school graduates unencumbered by debt
were significantly more likely to enter public interest careers).

37.

Science, technology, engineering, or mathematics.

38.

Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The Economic Value of a Law Degree, 43 J. Leg. Stud. 249,
263 (2014).

39.

And, of course, those who fail to complete their course of study.

40.

Susan Dynarski, Why Students with Smallest Debts Have the Larger Problem, N.Y. Times, Sept. 1,
2015, at A3.

41.

At the freestanding (i.e., not part of a larger university) law school with the highest rate of
default on student loans, 4.8% of students had defaulted. Stephanie Francis Ward, Which
Freestanding Law Schools Had the Highest Loan Default Rates for Fiscal Year 2014?, ABA Journal, Sept.
28, 2017, http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/which_law_schools_had_highest_
loan_defaults_for_fy_2014 [https://perma.cc/W6QB-FBBU]. In contrast, the overall
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federal student lending more profitable, but could also discourage college
graduates from pursuing legal education at all. And if aversion to borrowing
is unevenly distributed across the college graduate population, then the effect
may be to deter disproportionately those students who historically have been
underrepresented in law schools.
Third and most importantly, students who defy the signal sent by higher
interest rates and choose the major associated with lower earnings, who
nevertheless enroll in law school, and who then do choose lower-paying
careers in public service, will be penalized. The higher interest rate and
ensuing heavier repayment burden thus discourages public service, the very
thing that law school repayment assistance programs and the federal Public
Service Loan Forgiveness program seek to encourage.42 If law schools and the
wider legal community wish to expand access to justice, they should think
long and hard before adopting a policy that makes the choice to serve those
with limited or no access to representation more costly.
The challenges to law schools are more than theoretical. As law schools
continue to raise tuition above $50,000 or more for each of three years of study,
students confronting variable rates tied to career plans, for example, may
demand a different mix of classes, asking for more transactional classes and
classes that purport to make them “practice ready.” The cost of institutional
loan forgiveness programs will also go up. The cost of attending particular law
schools associated with lower postgraduate earnings might go up, if that were
included as a factor in setting the cost of a student loan. And then there is the
related possibility that lenders other than the federal government tie terms of
other forms of credit to academic performance. This possibility is addressed
further in the next section.
5. The goals pursued through variable pricing of education
loans are inconsistent with the aims of federal
intervention in higher education finance.
Simply put, the HEA sought to put higher education within reach of
aspiring students regardless of family wealth or income. Unlike prior federal
interventions into higher education finance, such as the GI Bill43 and the
National Defense Education Act,44 the HEA was not a component of a different
project, like helping veterans readjust to civilian life or defeating the Soviet
rate of default on student loans in fiscal 2014 was more than twice as high. Id. Professor
Simkovic and Professor McIntyre also report that for many years, law school borrowers have
consistently defaulted at a lower rate. Simkovic & McIntyre, supra note 38, at 275.
42.

Correspondingly, to the extent that law graduates benefit from PSLF as a result of pursuit
of public interest careers, the greater their debts, the greater the potential cost of loan
forgiveness to the taxpayer. This is an argument I am loath to make because PSLF is not
properly criticized or justified on the basis of cost, but higher interest rates as described here
would raise the cost of the program essentially for no reason.

43.

Pub. L. No. 78-346, 58 Stat. 284 (1944).

44.

Pub. L. No. 85-864, 72 Stat. 1580 (1958).
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Union in a race to the moon.45 The HEA was a broader and perhaps more
idealistic effort. While it may be a form of social engineering to make higher
education more widely accessible, the HEA did not aim to affect how students
used new federal benefits, to direct them to study particular subjects or pursue
particular careers that were more likely to yield higher salaries. To the contrary,
from the beginning federal legislation included provisions intended to entice
college students into low-pay careers, initially in teaching and later in other
public service-oriented jobs.46 Lawmakers sought to counter the messages sent
by the market rather than reinforce them. Even when lawmakers have used
tools of private finance, like debt, to help students pay for higher education,
they have done so strategically, adding benefits and protections not typically
available to consumers. For example, those students who plan to pursue a
career in teaching can receive a federal grant that converts into a loan should
the recipient change the plan.47
Lenders other than the federal government may try to use education-related
indicators, like the identity or nature of the institution a student attends or
that student’s choice of major, to set the terms of credit generally, not just for
student loans. Some lenders have made no secret of their business plan to
identify students who are likely to be high earners but who are not rich yet—
the highly desirable “HENRY.”48 Financial institutions like BankMobile use
sophisticated analysis of borrower characteristics well beyond past repayment
history, for example, to sell financial services to people who may so far only
have “thin” credit histories.49 SoFi, which refinances student loans and offers
personal and home loans, among other products, advises that “additional
factors, including your financial history, career experience, and monthly
income vs. expenses” play a role in determining eligibility and terms of
credit.50 Sofi’s loans are not fixed rate and may differ for different borrowers.
Thus, decisions students make about their courses of study and their career
45.

Glater, Student Debt and Higher Education Risk, supra note 4, at 1576.

46.

See, e.g., Higher Education Act, Pub. L. 89-329 (1965), §465 (providing for cancellation of
teachers’ student loans). The benefit was later broadened; see 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m) (2019)
(requiring the Secretary of Education to “cancel the balance of interest and principal due
. . . on any eligible Federal Direct Loan not in default” for borrowers who are employed in
public service and have met other criteria).

47.

20 U.S.C. § 1070g et seq. (2019).

48.

Shawn Tully & Joan Caplin, Look Who Pays for the Bailout, Fortune, Oct. 27, 2008, http://
archive.fortune.com/2008/10/24/magazines/fortune/tully_henrys.fortune/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/QK5M-MQ3T].

49.

Penny Crosman, BankMobile Deploys AI, Alternative Data to Lend to Thin-file Millennials, American
Banker, Dec. 20, 2017 (describing use of educational backgrounds of potential borrowers as
a factor in determining the availability and/or terms of credit), https://www.americanbanker.
com/news/bankmobile-deploys-ai-alternative-data-to-lend-to-fico-poor-students [https://
perma.cc/6S2W-9FVZ].

50.

Eligibility Criteria, SoFi, https://www.sofi.com/eligibility-criteria/#eligibility-personal
[https://perma.cc/E368-54Z9] (last visited July 25, 2018).
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ambitions could come to affect not only the cost of the loans they use to
finance higher education but the cost of the loans they will need later to buy a
car, a large appliance, a house—or further education.51
The next part turns to the issues created and the laws governing the
increasingly sophisticated marketing of credit using analysis of borrower
characteristics related to education, with particular attention to the risk of
disparate, adverse impact on people of color and members of other historically
excluded groups.
B. Variable Pricing and the Special Context of Law Schools
The potential adverse effects of variable pricing of student loans are greater
in the context of law school for at least three reasons. First, law students borrow
larger amounts than undergraduate students do.52 Second, and relatedly, the
freedom of law students to make career choices is accordingly more constrained
by the hard fact of indebtedness, and there is empirical evidence that debt
does affect students’ career choices.53 And third, greater levels of indebtedness
and worse loan terms will hamper the ability of law school graduates to serve
communities that have historically been underserved or denied access to legal
representation. It is this last concern that should make any policy potentially
adding to law school graduates’ debt burdens particularly worrisome to the
wider community.
Concern over the relationship between how law students finance their legal
education and their subsequent career options and choices is not new. More
than fifteen years ago, an American Bar Association task force warned that
“as law school tuitions and the debts of law students have increased, fewer
law school graduates can afford to take the comparatively low-paying public
service legal positions . . . that serve the poor.”54 Recognition of the obstacle
debt places in the way of public service-oriented students has led to expansion
51.

There will also likely be systemic effects if private lenders successfully lure greater numbers
of low-risk borrowers, like law school graduates, out of federal loan programs, leaving
behind those who more frequently default. See infra note 163 and accompanying text. The
result could be higher costs of the federal aid program, potentially exposing taxpayers and/
or causing the government to raise interest rates on student loans.

52.

In the 2015-2016 academic year, bachelor’s degree recipients who borrowed owed, on average,
$28,400 in student loans. Trends in Student Aid 2017, supra note 27, at 20. The average
indebtedness of law school graduates is higher. U.S. News & World Report, Best Grad
Schools 2019, https://www.usnews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/grad-debtrankings [https://perma.cc/C92M-4N2S] (showing that average levels of indebtedness at
different law schools range from a low of $53,237 to a high of $198,962).

53.

Field, supra note 2 (observing that “[t]he fact that income-contingent tuition subsidies
are associated with higher rates of public interest law than are financially equivalent loan
repayment schemes provides strong evidence of the influence of debt burden on job choice
in a real world setting”).

54.

ABA Commission on Loan Repayment and Forgiveness, Lifting
Student Debt as a Barrier to Public Service 14 (2003).
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of loan repayment assistance programs (“LRAPs”) at the law school level55
and the Public Service Loan Forgiveness program, discussed above, at the
federal level.56 Yet these interventions, taking effect only after students have
borrowed, come with strings57 and may not be enough to overcome students’
aversion to working in a low-pay field under a substantial debt overhang.58
The decisions of indebted graduates are part of a broader mosaic of wellanalyzed barriers to providing access to justice to populations long denied
representation.59 Yet the impact of federal aid policy on law student decisionmaking deserves considerably more study, and analysis of the access gap within
the civil justice system must include assessment of the role that indebtedness
plays. If aid policy at the federal and institutional levels discourages graduates
from embarking on public service, then successful reforms must extend beyond
better funding for legal aid60 to include more effective and more generous
subsidies for law students aspiring to be legal aid lawyers. This ancillary effect
of aid policy in the context of law schools emphasizes the need to make the
terms of loans more generous rather than less.
III. Challenging discriminatory use of education-related criteria in lending
Whatever the wisdom of tying interest rates on student loans to student
characteristics and choices, the practice is already used with consumer loans
in the private sector. Some sophisticated lenders, making “private” loans that
carry no government guarantee, are using diverse, nontraditional data gathered
about potential borrowers to identify those likely to be low risk. Some of these
lenders, financial institutions like SoFi, focus on education-related loans and
offer to undercut the rates charged by the federal government for students
55.

See American Bar Association, Loan Repayment Assistance Programs (LRAP), https://www.
americanbar.org/groups/center-pro-bono/resources/directory_of_law_school_public_
interest_pro_bono_programs/definitions/pi_lrap/ (listing LRAPs at numerous law
schools) (last visited Aug. 2, 2018).

56.

See supra note 9 and accompanying text.

57.

For example, requiring students to work in a public interest job for a minimum of ten years,
and keeping current on monthly student loan payments throughout that period. 34 C.F.R.
§685.219(c) (2019). Further, as a practical matter and as of this writing, the federal Education
Department has been notoriously stingy in providing forgiveness to students who thought
themselves eligible. Stacy Cowley, 28,000 Public Servants Sought Student Loan Forgiveness. 96 Got It.,
N.Y. Times (Sep. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/27/business/student-loanforgiveness.html.

58.

See Field, supra note 2, at 19 (describing the relative impact of provision of a grant convertible
to a loan and an economically equivalent loan eligible for repayment assistance and
concluding that debt qua debt deters pursuit of public interest careers and concluding
that law schools seeking to encourage public service provide grants ex ante rather than loan
forgiveness ex post).

59.

See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice: A Roadmap for Reform, 41 Fordham Urb. L. J. 1227,
1230 (2014) (identifying structural barriers to providing access to justice).

60.

Id. at 1229 (describing cuts in funding to legal aid).
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who are in repayment, for example.61 Other lenders take into account the
educational experiences of potential borrowers as one set of factors among
many nontraditional criteria considered in deciding whether to extend credit
and, if so, on what terms.62 In the fast-evolving world of financial technology,
or “fintech,”63 educational background is just one type of variable that lenders
use,64 and the applicable antidiscrimination legislative and regulatory regime
discussed here governs use of other criteria, too. The focus of this essay is on
lender use of education-related criteria in credit decisions.
Lenders that use nontraditional criteria like educational background are
exploiting both technology and culture. Technology enables them to analyze
numerous variables to find and exploit correlations between propensity to repay
or default on loans, as well as to gather information on potential borrowers
that might previously have been more difficult to obtain. Culture, in turn, has
both conditioned student borrowers to share information about themselves
very readily,65 making the lenders’ data gathering easier, and reinforced the
idea that terms of student loans should reflect riskiness to the lender. From
this perspective, when extending credit to pay for an education, the lender
is making an individual and private investment, rather than an investment in a
larger community, and is enabling the borrower to purchase a personal and
private good, rather than to serve the public good.66 The two notions are
complementary.
When lenders assess the creditworthiness of potential borrowers, there
is always the possibility that bias, express or implicit,67 may affect decision61.

Save Thousands on Your Student Loans, SoFi, https://www.sofi.com/refinance-student-loan/
[https://perma.cc/L8G5-T9PL] (last visited Aug. 2, 2018).

62.

Matthew Adam Bruckner, The Promise and Perils of Algorithmic Lenders’ Use of Big Data, 93 Chi.Kent L. Rev. 3, 15 (2018) (“Instead of limiting their use of data to information that has
a reasonably clear relationship with creditworthiness, they are embracing the unclear
relationships between ‘Big Data’ and creditworthiness.”).

63.

Id. at 7.

64.

Use of data on potential borrowers may turn any characteristic into a criterion available to
lenders, from social media activity to online search history to, of course, choice of major. Id.
at 13. Some so-called data brokers claim to have amassed thousands of data points on each
and every consumer in the country. Amy J. Schmitz, Secret Consumer Scores and Segmentations:
Separating Consumer ‘Haves’ from ‘Have-Nots,’ 2014 Mich. St. L. Rev. 1411, 1413 (2014).

65.

Lee Rainie & Maeve Duggan, Privacy and Information Sharing, Pew Research Center, Jan. 14,
2016, https://www.pewinternet.org/2016/01/14/privacy-and-information-sharing/ [https://
perma.cc/ND94-DQY7] (describing people’s willingness to share personal information in
various contexts).

66.

Tension over the goal and proper characterization of higher education is endemic in the
United States generally and in federal policy in this area in particular. See generally David
Labaree, Public Goods, Private Goods: The American Struggle Over Educational Goals, 34 Am. Educ.
Res. J. 39, 41 (1997) (arguing that the “history of American education has been a tale of
ambivalent goals and muddled outcomes”).

67.

While express or explicit bias takes the form of animus—the self-aware belief that because of
group membership, an individual deserves to be treated worse than others not members of
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making. Lenders may deliberately discriminate against borrowers based on
borrower characteristics, for example by refusing to lend to African American
applicants. Lenders may decline to lend or charge higher rates to borrowers
from particular geographic areas that are dominated by African Americans,
justifying the practice with a rationale that is facially race-neutral. Deliberate
or intentional discrimination on the basis of the race of an applicant for credit
is prohibited by law, as will be discussed further below. Policies or practices
that do not explicitly consider a protected characteristic, such as race, but that
still have a consistent, disparate effect on applicants for credit who share that
protected characteristic, raise more complex issues. These issues persist even
though technology has been touted as a means to combat discrimination by
reducing the role of human, subjective, and potentially biased judgment in
credit decisions.68 Human bias can find its way into algorithms.69
While the preceding Part offered a critique of the practice of tying student
loan terms to student decisions about courses of study to pursue, institutions
to attend, and careers to enter, this Part turns to the terms of other kinds of
consumer loans when lenders consider education, or borrower characteristics
related to education, as a criterion. The discussion that follows explores
and analyzes potential limitations of the legal framework that applies to
discrimination in the extension of credit, with explicit attention to possible
causes of action against lenders whose practices have the effect of penalizing
borrowers who are members of groups historically excluded from and currently
underrepresented in higher education in the United States. This analysis
identifies the ways in which sophisticated lenders’ assessment of education
characteristics of potential borrowers could reinforce and perpetuate existing
disparities in access to credit and socioeconomic inequality more generally.
Lender inclusion of education characteristics in decisions about whether
and on what terms to extend credit could operate in disparate fashion in
different ways. If students of color, for example, on average have fewer years of
schooling and a lender considers years of schooling as an indicator of default
risk justifying denial or higher pricing of credit, then borrowers of color will
be disproportionately affected. If students of color disproportionately choose
particular majors and lenders associate those majors with higher risk of
default, the same thing may happen. If lenders perceive graduates of certain
types of institutions, such as for-profit institutions or historically black colleges
and universities (“HBCUs”), as riskier than graduates of other institutions,
that subordinated group—“[i]mplicit racial biases refer to the unconscious stereotypes and
attitudes that we associate with racial groups.” L. Song Richardson, Systemic Triage: Implicit
Racial Bias in the Criminal Courtroom, 126 Yale L.J. 862, 876 (2017).
68.

Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 Cal. L. Rev. 671, 677
(2016) (warning that although the “very point of data mining is to provide a rational basis
upon which to distinguish between individuals and to reliably confer to the individual the
qualities possessed by those who seem statistically similar . . .[,] data mining holds the
potential to unduly discount members of legally protected classes and to place them at
systematic relative disadvantage”).

69.

Id.
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imposing more costly loan terms would disproportionately affect the students
of color who disproportionately attend those institutions.70
To be sure, educational backgrounds of borrowers are just one category of
characteristics that, if considered in the consumer credit context, could have
a disparate effect on historically subordinated groups. Some sophisticated
modern lenders view all personal information as potentially relevant to credit
decisions.71 Lenders may combine conventional credit history, reflecting past
borrowing and repayment activity, with a vast and varied assortment of data
on both online and offline activity in an effort to predict more accurately
the likelihood of repayment.72 The quantity and nature of data collected on
consumers using technology has drawn considerable attention and a share of
critics.73 This “big data” is used by sophisticated marketers and commercial
entities, including but not limited to lenders, to target customers with
differentiated products, including credit.74 For example, lenders may develop or
purchase an algorithm—a mathematical procedure that incorporates different
variables that reflect consumer behavior or characteristics, such as spending
habits, location, or, the concern of this essay, educational background—and use
it to decide what to sell, on what terms, to whom.75 Much of the commentary
on these practices has focused on the scale and scope of data collection, the
intrusiveness of collection methods, the risk of inaccuracies that have costly
effects on consumers,76 and the potential for disparate effects along lines of
70.

This could be done indirectly, too, if a lender were to charge a higher rate or decline to
extend credit to a borrower who graduated from or attended an institution where the overall
default rate on students loans was deemed too high. This was the basis of a claim filed by
one student against Sallie Mae; the case settled. Final Judgment Rodriguez v. Sallie Mae
(SLM) Corp., No. 3:07-cv-01866-WWE (D. Conn. Oct. 17, 2011).

71.

See, e.g., Our Story, ZestFinance, https://internationalfintech.com/Company/zestfinance/
(last visited July 12, 2019) (touting the ability to “consume vast amounts of data to more
accurately identify good borrowers—enabling higher repayment rates for lenders and lowercost credit for consumers”).

72.

Mikella Hurley & Julius Adebayo, Credit Scoring in the Era of Big Data, 18 Yale J. L. & Tech. 148,
157-58 (2016).

73.

See, e.g., Schmitz, Secret Consumer, supra note 64, at 1413-15 (describing the collection of vast
amount of data on consumers and warning of perpetuation of “cycles of poverty” as a result
of increasingly precise targeting of consumers); see also Edith Ramirez et al., Fed. Trade
Comm’n, Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability 46-47 (2014), https://www.ftc.
gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-reportfederal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf (describing commercial
collection and use of data to develop consumer profiles and identifying risk of use or misuse
of “sensitive” information, such as ethnicity).

74.

Schmitz, Secret Consumer, supra note 64, at 1425-26.

75.

Algorithms may produce composite “scores,” reflecting these consumer behavior and
characteristics in summary form to enable commercial entities to try to gauge consumer
desirability. Id. at 1427 (describing “customized statistical scores that enable customized
marketing”).

76.

The Fair Credit Reporting Act, infra Part III.C., focuses more on this issue of accuracy of
information, but is less relevant for purposes of the discussion that follows than is the Equal
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race, class, sex, gender, or other identity characteristics. Less scholarship,
however, has focused on the specific implications of use of information on
consumers’ educational background and on the possible protection afforded
by the existing federal statutory consumer protection framework. The balance
of this essay contributes to analysis of these two narrower topics.
Data points that a lender might use could have disproportionate effects on
people who belong to historically subordinated groups, and there is a fastgrowing body of scholarship recognizing and analyzing that risk.77 The focus
here will remain on lender use of criteria related to education, in part because
that is most relevant to the potential future experiences of law students and the
schools they attend and in part because the consequences of using educational
background as a credit criterion may have effects beyond the individual
borrower, affecting access to justice.
Although the extension of credit is governed at the federal level by a
complex network of statutes, consumer lending is less thoroughly and
consistently regulated than is mortgage lending. Data collection and
disclosure requirements and prohibitions are different in consumer lending,
potentially making identification of discriminatory practices in the consumer
lending context more difficult. This part explores the protections afforded by
and the limits of the federal78 laws that do reach consumer lending, including
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”),79 the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(“FCRA”),80 and the prohibitions against “unfair, deceptive, or abusive act[s]
or practice[s]” (known as UDAPs).81 These laws govern consumer credit in
general rather than student loans in particular.82 It bears emphasizing that
there almost certainly are possible means of regulating use by lenders of
borrowers’ educational background under state law, and these means should
merit futher exploration.
Credit Opportunity Act, infra Part III.A.
77.

See, e.g., Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 72, at 152 (warning that use of big data in lending
decisions could overtake civil rights protections “by using seemingly innocuous information,
like consumers’ retail preferences, as proxies for sensitive attributes like race”); Christopher
Odinet, The New Data of Student Debt, forthcoming, 19 U.S.C. L. Rev. __, 55 (2019) (warning
of the risk that “use of alternative, education-based data can exacerbate existing credit
inequalities” even when facially neutral, and developing a proposal for new lender
underwriting guidelines), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID3386205_
code1528821.pdf?abstractid=3349478&mirid=1 and on file with author.

78.

This essay will not extend beyond federal laws governing consumer credit.

79.

15 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq. (2019).

80.

15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (2019).

81.

12 U.S.C. § 5531(a) (2019).

82.

Private loans still enjoy exceptional treatment under the federal Bankruptcy Code, however.
See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2019) (permitting discharge of student loans, whether federal or
private, only if a borrower can demonstrate “undue hardship”).
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A. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act83
The ECOA flatly prohibits creditors from discriminating against applicants
for credit “on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital
status, or age (provided the applicant has the capacity to contract).”84 Current
law authorizes the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) to
promulgate regulations to implement this prohibition, as well as other
provisions of the Act.85 Regulation B gives effect to the prohibition on
discrimination.86 The rule repeats the statutory ban on discrimination on a
“prohibited basis,” and also prohibits a creditor from making statements that
would discourage “on a prohibited basis a reasonable person from making
or pursuing an application” for credit.87 To discourage discrimination on a
prohibited basis, Regulation B bars a creditor from “inquir[ing] about the
race, color, religion, national origin, or sex of an applicant or any other
person in connection with a credit transaction.”88 Perversely, in the absence
of data revealing these demographic characteristics of borrowers, recognizing
problematic patterns is more challenging. Creditors may seek any other
information, though,89 presumably in an effort to balance the lender’s desire
to “know as much as possible about a prospective borrower and . . . the
borrower’s right not to disclose information irrelevant to the credit transaction
or relevant information that may be used in connection with discrimination on
a prohibited basis.”90
Identification of lender practices that make explicit use of prohibited
applicant information is straightforward: If a lender has an express policy
or practice of denying credit to African American applicants or of charging
higher interest rates to financially identical applicants who differ only in their
racial backgrounds, that lender has violated the law. That, however, is not the
challenge posed by sophisticated techniques used by lenders with increasing
frequency. The possibility of discrimination by proxy arises if a lender uses
criteria that are facially neutral but that have a disparate impact on borrowers
who share a prohibited characteristic. For example, a lender might decline to
lend in certain ZIP codes associated with predominantly African American
neighborhoods and justify the decision by identifying a connection between
default risk and location. Alternatively, a lender might decline to extend credit
83.

15 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq. (2019).

84.

15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (2019).

85.

15 U.S.C. § 1691b (2019).

86.

12 C.F.R. § 1002.1(a) (2019).

87.

12 C.F.R. § 1002.4(b) (2019).

88.

12 C.F.R. § 1002.5(b) (2019). The rule permits a creditor to inquire about this information,
however, for purposes of “monitor[ing]… compliance” with the ECOA, provided that
specified disclosures are provided to the applicant. Id.

89.

12 C.F.R. § 1002.5(a) (2019).

90.

Pricing Without Discrimination, supra note 7, at 4.
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to or might impose a higher interest rate on a potential borrower who attended
a particular type of academic institution, and that institution might in turn
be associated overwhelmingly with students of common racial or ethnic
background.91
These scenarios may be more likely when lenders use a greater variety
of data on borrowers than was possible in the past, for at least two reasons.
First, when lenders look for correlations between likelihood of nonpayment
and other variables, the correlations they find may track but mask prohibited
characteristics, such as race. This may be the case even if the lender does not
affirmatively seek to discriminate. The discriminatory impact results if the
facially neutral variable that correlates with default risk also correlates with
race, national origin, color, or sex. The doctrinal challenges posed by this kind
of correlation are discussed below.
The second reason that use of a wider variety of borrower characteristics in
assessing creditworthiness may have disparate effects on applicants who share
a prohibited characteristic is the effect of choosing facially neutral variables
to consider. Using a neutral characteristic correlated disproportionately with
a prohibited characteristic will then entrench inequality as surely as prior de
jure exclusion from opportunity sought to. The lender’s selection of particular
borrower characteristics to include in the search for correlations with default
risk would be limited by the universe of types of data collected and almost
certainly would be affected by assumptions about which of those characteristics
should be included in any assessment. Again, for example, a lender may believe
geography is relevant and include that as a variable, although geography
masks another variable that holds predictive power; that is, geography may
not be explanatory but may correlate with the variable that is explanatory. At
a deeper level, the reason that a facially neutral characteristic like where an
applicant for credit lives or whether an applicant owns a home may be overt
historical discrimination. Consider a lawsuit brought by black applicants for
credit who alleged that a bank’s use of criminal history in credit decisions
violated ECOA because of the disparate impact of the policy along lines of
91.

Sasha Rodriguez made this argument in a lawsuit against Sallie Mae several years ago,
alleging that the lender discriminated on the basis of race by taking into account the cohort
default rate at the school a borrower attended: the higher the overall default rate at that
school, the higher the rate charged to borrowers who attended it, notwithstanding each
borrower’s risk profile. Rodriguez v. SLM Corp., Mem. Decision on Mot. Dismiss Am.
Compl., 07-cv-1866 (Mar. 6, 2009), at 3 “Due to Sallie Mae’s determination of rates and
fees based on the school that the student attends, a student attending a school with a
high minority population does not have the same rates and fees available as a similarlysituated Caucasian attending a school with a lower minority population.” Id. at 4. And at
the aggregate level, the use of institutional default rates constitutes a “fair lending concern,”
the CFPB found in 2012, because black and Latinx students are several times more likely
than other students to attend institutions with higher default rates. Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau, Fair Lending Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 22 (Dec. 2012),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201212_cfpb_fair-lending-report.pdf.
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race.92 Black people disproportionately have criminal records.93 However,
the trial court concluded that because the bank did not automatically reject
applicants with criminal histories and because “criminal record is legitimately
related to its extension of credit,”94 the practice could stand.
Courts generally have accepted statistical evidence of disparate impact to
make a prima facie case that ECOA has been violated, then allowed a defendant
to offer a justification, then permitted the plaintiff to argue that another practice
could serve the stated goal without causing disparate impact.95 This framework
tracks doctrine in other contexts involving allegations of discrimination,
including housing96 and employment97—although the Supreme Court has
not yet explicitly ruled that plaintiffs suing under the ECOA may rely on the
same kind of statistical evidence of disparate impact as decisions under the
Fair Housing Act,98 for example, permit.99 Regardless, plaintiffs in consumer
lending cases that do not involve home loans face higher barriers than those
in cases that do because of the difficulty of gathering the data needed to show
a statistical disparity: The ECOA generally prohibits lenders from inquiring
about applicants’ race, color, religion, national origin, or sex.100 Without such
92.

A.B. & S. Auto Service, Inc. v. South Shore Bank of Chicago, 962 F. Supp. 1056, 1059 (N.D.
Ill. 1997).

93.

See, e.g., The Sentencing Project, The Color of Justice: Racial and Ethnic Disparity in State Prisons 4
(June 14, 2016), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/color-of-justice-racial-andethnic-disparity-in-state-prisons/ (finding that black people are “incarcerated at a rate that is
5.1 times that of whites”).

94.

A.B. & S. Auto Service, Inc. v. South Shore Bank of Chicago, 962 F. Supp. 1056, 1064 (N.D.
Ill. 1997) (criminal history was relevant to the bank’s assessment of an applicant’s “judgment
and character”).

95.

See, e.g., Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dept. Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 747 F.3d
275, 282 (5th Cir. 2014), rev’d on other grounds, 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015) (reviewing recent judicial
opinions and concluding that “[w]hile the approaches of our sister circuits have varied,
the most recent decisions have applied a similar three-step burden-shifting approach”). The
United States Supreme Court reversal is discussed infra note 100. See also Barocas and Selbst,
supra note 68, at 701 (explaining the legal analysis of disparate impact claims in the context
of employment discrimination claims).

96.

Huntington Branch NAACP v. Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 936 (2d Cir. 1988).

97.

Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577-78 (2009).

98.

42 U.S.C. §3604 et seq. (2019).

99.

Winnie Taylor, Proving Racial Discrimination and Monitoring Fair Lending Compliance: The Missing
Data Problem in Nonmortgage Credit, 31 Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 199, 200 (2011). However,
the implication of regulators’ explanation of the availability of disparate impact theory
suggests that the answer to this question should be yes. Policy Statement on Discrimination
in Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. 18266 (Apr. 15, 1994), https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/1994/04/15/94-9214/policy-statement-on-discrimination-in-lending-noticedepartment-of-housing-and-urban-development.

100. 12 C.F.R. §202.5(b) (2019). A lender may gather such information “for the purpose of
conducting a self-test,” id., and the data gathered thereby is “privileged” provided that
the lender takes “appropriate corrective action” if evidence of a possible ECOA violation
is discovered. 12 C.F.R. §202.15 (2019). Federal legislation requires collection of data on
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data, and given the potential complexity of the methods of evaluation that
lenders may use to assess possible borrowers’ creditworthiness, consumers
seeking to make a prima facie case of an ECOA violation using statistical
evidence of potential discrimination face a steep climb.101
When a lender does use a criterion that has a disproportionate, negative
effect on consumers who share a characteristic covered by the ECOA
prohibition, that lender may defend its policy or practice as justified by a
“business necessity.”102 This is how a lender could justify relying on a correlation
between default risk and a facially neutral characteristic that correlates with a
prohibited characteristic, and this is where challenges to lenders’ use of facially
neutral criteria are likely to encounter difficulty. Educational background,
whether reflecting the individual borrower or the borrower’s institution, may
be correlated with race, but it is not race itself. The Supreme Court for many
years has adopted a formalistic focus on explicit use of race as a criterion.103 A
majority of the Justices object to explicit use of race to classify any individual,
but not necessarily to use of criteria that may serve, intentionally or not, as
proxies for race.104
Because lenders adopting nontraditional criteria to assess potential
borrowers can assert that they are drawing on insights about creditworthiness
produced by analysis of a wide range of personal data, they will be wellpositioned to argue that deployment of whatever criteria they use is supported
by analysis. For example, taking into account choice of major—even if that
major highly correlates with race—in setting a borrower’s interest rate could
well be supported by a finding that a particular major correlates with a higher
or lower likelihood of default. It may be that individual decision-makers
within the lender organization harbor explicit racial bias, but bias is not
otherwise prohibited borrower characteristics in the context of small business lending.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 (2010).
101. Taylor, supra note 99, at 206; see also Schmitz, Secret Consumer, supra note 64, at 1445 (describing
criticism of ECOA as “largely ineffective in addressing the subtle discrimination that occurs
with respect to lending and credit scoring”).
102. Tex. Dept. Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507,
2517 (2015). The courts have adopted this framework in other cases involving different
antidiscrimination laws; this case involved the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §3601 et seq.
103. See Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race
Equality Cases, 120 Yale L. J. 1278, 1291-92 (2011) (describing the Court’s move over time
to adopt the view that the “presumption against racial classifications impugned the
constitutional validity of benign, race-conscious efforts to integrate”).
104. Developing such proxies using publicly available information may not present great difficulty,
were a lender to try to do so. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau undertook the
task itself a few years ago in an effort to find cases of unfair lending practices despite the
prohibition on lenders’ collection of data on prohibited characteristics. Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau, Using Publicly Available Information to Proxy for Unidentified Race and Ethnicity: A
Methodology and Assessment (2014), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201409_cfpb_report_
proxy-methodology.pdf (describing research project to use surname- and geography-based
information to produce a proxy for race and ethnicity).
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necessary, and finding evidence of bias would certainly be very difficult for any
plaintiff.105 And of course it may also be that decisions are driven by data: A
lender might well insist that an automated process uncovered the correlation
in the process of sifting through reams of data to identify novel indicators
of default risk.106 Indeed, a lender might not even know the criteria used by
an artificial intelligence, designed to search for patterns in a great mass of
data, or how it weighed them in reaching a conclusion about the appropriate
terms of credit.107 It may be necessary to reverse-engineer the credit analysis,
if possible, to determine what applicant characteristics played a role. It is not
impermissible for a lender to make decisions based on factors like cost and
profitability,108 both of which naturally could be affected by borrower default
rates.
To overcome this business necessity defense, an applicant for credit or a
borrower may allege that the lender has alternative methods to achieve the
same business objective.109 A search found few cases in which a court evaluated
an ECOA plaintiff’s proffered less discriminatory alternative. 110 Looking
105. Andrea Freeman, Racism in the Credit Card Industry, 95 N.C. L. Rev. 1071, 1125 (2017) (concluding
that “because the plaintiff has the burden to prove that illegal discrimination took place
and the creditor need only present an acceptable motive for an adverse action, defendants
generally prevail in” ECOA cases).
106. This is a form of machine learning. It is also of course possible to discriminate intentionally
using sophisticated creditor analysis. See Barocas and Selbst, supra note 68, at 712-13.
107. Yavar Bathaee, The Artificial Intelligence Black Box and the Failure of Intent and Causation, 31 Harv. J.
L. & Tech. 889, 907 (2018) (describing artificial intelligence as a “back box” the workings of
which may be very difficult to discern, even by those using it).
108. Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. at 18269 (“When an agency
finds that a lender’s policy or practice has a disparate impact, the next step is to seek to
determine whether the policy or practice is justified by a ‘business necessity.’ The justification
must be manifest and may not be hypothetical or speculative. Factors that may be relevant
to the justification could include cost and profitability”).
109. Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. at 18269 (“a policy or practice
that has a disparate impact on a prohibited basis . . . still may be found to be discriminatory
if an alternative policy or practice could serve the same purpose with less discriminatory
effect”).
110. The Westlaw search encompassed federal district courts, courts of appeal, and the Supreme
Court, using the search terms “Equal Credit Opportunity Act” or “ECOA” and the
phrase “less discriminatory.” The search identified just five cases: Coleman v. Gen. Motors
Acceptance Corp., 220 F.R.D. 64 (M.D. Tenn. 2004); Diamond Ventures LLC v. Baruah,
699 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D.D.C. 2010); Ramirez v. Greenpoint Mortg. Funding Inc., 268 F.R.D.
627 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Garcia v. Country Wide Fin. Corp., 2008 WL 7842104 (C.D. Cal.
2008) and Jones v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 2005 WL 743213 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). None reached
evaluation of a plaintiff’s proffered alternative policy to replace that at issue in the case.
A search encompassing the same courts and searching for either “business necessity” or
“business objective” along with references to the law produced seventeen cases (some of the
same as those found in the first search), but in none of the cases did a reviewing court assess
the offered business justification. However, in another recent case in which the jury was
instructed on the need to evaluate whether a corporate defendant, accused of discrimination
in violation of the ECOA, could have used a different business practice that had less of a
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to other discrimination law contexts in which courts use the same burdenshifting approach, though, is suggestive. It appears that, even when provided
with a plaintiff’s well-supported, alternative, nondiscriminatory policy or
practice, courts will not thereupon shift attention back to the defendant but
will still conduct further assessment of the plaintiff’s proposal. More precisely,
a judge will very likely follow the steps outlined by the Supreme Court in
Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio and proceed to assess whether a plaintiff’s
less discriminatory alternative (i) will be “equally effective” in achieving the
defendant’s stated goal and (ii) will not have the same or a worse, disparate
impact.111 These considerations complicate any plaintiff’s path to a remedy,
effectively adding a somewhat vague pair of criteria to the three-part test112
outlined above.
Consider Hardie v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, a case in which the
plaintiff brought a Civil Rights Act challenge against the NCAA’s practice of
excluding anyone with a felony conviction from coaching at NCAA-certified
youth athletic tournaments.113 The defendant justified the rule as protecting
youthful participants in sporting events.114 The presiding judge concluded
that the plaintiff could not demonstrate that his proposed alternative policy,
a slightly less restrictive version of the challenged policy, would result in an
identical or reduced likelihood of harm to participants in sporting events.115
The successful plaintiff, this case suggests, would have to offer strong
statistical evidence of the effect of a proposed alternative policy—evidence
likely to lead to dueling experts—as well as a compelling argument that the
fix would still achieve a defendant’s stated goal, which almost certainly would
involve somewhat subjective assessments. This is a tall order. Furthermore,
the Ninth Circuit panel noted in passing that a plaintiff’s alternative policy
could fail the Supreme Court’s two-part Wards Cove test if it exacerbates the
discriminatory effect. This means that if a reviewing court concludes that a
plaintiff’s proposal, for example, makes it easier for all applicants for credit to
obtain loans but racial disparities persist or worsen simply because more white
applicants apply, then the judge could reject that alternative proposal.116
discriminatory effect, Saint-Jean v. Emigrant Mortg. Co., the court did not require the plaintiffs
to offer an actual, concrete and specific, “equally effective” alternative. 337 F.Supp. 3d 186,
200 (2018) (ruling against the defendant’s post-verdict challenge to the jury instruction; the
defendant argued that the jury should have been instructed that the plaintiff had to specify
an alternative practice).
111.

Wards Cove Packing Co. Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 660-61 (1989).

112. I.e., showing of disparate impact, defendant response, plaintiff offer of alternative, but then
the assessment of the proffered alternative. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
113.

Hardie v. Nat’l Coll. Athletic Assoc., 876 F.3d 312 (2017). The plaintiff alleged that the
practice violated Title II of the Act, which prohibits racial discrimination in places of public
accommodation. Id.

114. Id. at 316.
115.

Id. at 322.

116. Id. at 320.
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What are the implications, then, of this doctrinal framework for challenges
to lenders’ use of educational characteristics of applicants for credit? Of course,
such characteristics are not among those prohibited by the ECOA. Absent
evidence of intent to use educational criteria to discriminate along lines of
race, color, national origin, or religion, to support a disparate treatment claim,
a prima facie case would require evidence of disparate impact. To demonstrate
illegal disparate impact, the challenger would need data to establish that
education-related criteria correlated with race, because the statute does
not recognize education status as a suspect classification. Here, a potential
claimant would encounter the first significant hurdle: data collection.117 As
discussed more fully above, lenders not only need not but are forbidden to ask
about the race, color, national origin, or sex of applicants for credit. This is a
pragmatic obstacle rather than a doctrinal one.
Even when successful in gathering statistical evidence of disparate
impact on credit applicants who share a prohibited characteristic, plaintiffs
challenging use of education-related criteria would confront a lender’s allbut-certain “business necessity” defense. The sophisticated lender drawing on
nontraditional borrower characteristics could be expected to show a reviewing
court that education-related criteria, including institution attended, choice of
major, repayment norms among students attending the same institution, or
the amount of education debt taken on all related to and were valid predictors
of the likelihood of borrower default.118 All but the most quantitatively
sophisticated plaintiffs, somehow in possession of data that any defendant
would protect vociferously, would have a difficult time rebutting the argument
that the facially neutral characteristic, educational background, constituted
useful information for the lender.119 If the lender does not even know what
variables an artificial intelligence weighed in reaching a credit recommendation
or decision, the challenge is even greater.
Even if a challenger were able to access and analyze a lender’s data
purportedly supporting use of educational background in credit decisions by,
for example, showing that the order in which criteria are considered affected
the validity of the correlation with risk of default, there would remain a third
barrier. Challengers must argue that there is an alternative method that the
lender could use to assess creditworthiness that would not have the same, or
more severe, disparate impact. Harder still, a judge could conceivably require
the plaintiff to develop an alternative algorithm producing a less severe effect,
117.

This is not a new challenge. See, e.g., Cherry v. Amoco Oil Co., 490 F. Supp. 1026, 1030 (1980)
(reviewing court observes that “the effects test based on statistical methodology is apt to be
quite difficult for a plaintiff” because the “Act specifically proscribes inquiry by the creditor
into the race, sex or marital status of a credit applicant, except in loans secured by residential
real estate” and rejects the plaintiff’s evidence of disparate impact).

118. A lender could seek to develop an algorithm that did not have disparate effects on members
of a protected class, but it might be hard to argue that a lender must take on such a task. And
to adopt less discriminatory pricing of credit would not address the normative concerns
about the practice in the context of education. See generally Part II supra.
119. Bruckner, supra note 62, at 54-55.
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and then persuade the reviewing court that the alternative algorithm was
“equally effective” in achieving the lender’s goal in using the prior, challenged
assessment.120 Given that an assessment of creditworthiness is predictive and
inherently uncertain, a lender might well argue that the proposed alternative
would not be as effective, setting up a battle of experts over the strength
of competing algorithms. Further, the reviewing court could consider the
costliness of switching evaluation methods in determining whether to order
the lender to adopt the plaintiff’s alternative methodology.121
These difficulties suggest that in the absence of regulation122 or legislation,
perhaps to limit the scope of information lenders may use in deciding whether
to extend credit and on what terms, or perhaps to eliminate consideration of
application assessment processes and instead focus instead on credit decision
outcomes, ECOA-based challenges to use of education-related criteria will
prove difficult.123 Furthermore, the difficulty of data gathering will hamper
disclosure of evidence of disparities that could move a court or the court of
public opinion. In the short term, a relatively modest legislative move, simply
removing the prohibition on collecting information on borrower race, ethnicity,
age, sex, national origin, or religious background, would help overcome this
second obstacle, although at the cost of making it easier for a lender to engage
in traditional discrimination. In the longer term, a sophisticated, informed,
and, most important, motivated regulator probably must commit to an
evaluation of the effects of lender lender practices. At the federal level, such a
regulator may be a long time coming.124
Critical race analysis of the shortcomings of judicial interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment and of legislation ostensibly aimed at combating
discrimination in various contexts has thoroughly identified the pernicious
effects of doctrine distinguishing between conduct motivated by intentional
discrimination and conduct that has a disparate impact.125 By treating disparate
120. Wards Cove Packing Co. Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 661 (1989). Of course, Wards Cove was
not an ECOA case, so it is conceivable that a court could adopt a different standard in this
context. However, in Saint-Jean v. Emigrant Mortg. Co., supra note 110, the judge did not
require such a high degree of specificity, offering hope to future plaintiffs.
121.

Id. The same possibility alluded to above, supra note 120, applies.

122. Or, potentially, novel enforcement tactics that extend the reach of existing regulation or
legislation.
123. This analysis is not dissimilar to that reached by Barocas and Selbst, supra note 68, in their
analysis of use of information gleaned by sophisticated use of data by employers in the
context of Title VII. They conclude that many uses of data mining may well pass legal
muster. Id. at 709.
124. Pursuant to the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Financial Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203 (2010), state attorneys general may also enforce provisions of federal
consumer protection laws, including ECOA. 12 U.S.C. § 5552 (2019).
125. See, e.g., Ian Haney López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1779, 1781 (2012) (describing
the Supreme Court’s shift toward exclusion of “social science to prove discrimination and
insist[ing] instead on unworkable determinations of individual animus”).
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outcomes as constitutionally actionable when the result of explicitly biased
decisions by individuals motivated by discriminatory animus, the Supreme
Court has failed to block discrimination effected through facially neutral
mechanisms or to overturn decisions that do not appear to be motivated by
overt bias.126 The Court appears to have accepted government use of facially
neutral practices and policies even if they have racially identifiable effects. 127
Regulations implementing the ECOA explicitly address the disparate impact
of creditor practices,128 paving the way for private as well as governmental
enforcement. In this, the law lacks the shortcomings of constitutional doctrine
that CRT scholars have identified. However, as a practical matter, the ECOA
creates barriers for plaintiffs resembling those that the Supreme Court has
erected in its recent antidiscrimination decisions: The plaintiff with evidence of
evil intent is far more likely to succeed.129 Plaintiffs alleging ECOA violations
must obtain statistical evidence that is difficult to come by, more so in the
context of algorithmic lending decisions informed by artificial intelligence,
and then must overcome creditor argument that the data and algorithms used
serve a legitimate business necessity. Thus protected by secrecy and cloaked in
complexity, lender practices may be practically unassailable, and the disparate
impact claims under the ECOA consequently may be available in theory
but not in fact. This is not to make an argument for any particular level of
enforcement, to be sure, but to note that obstacles to ECOA claims are greater
than they would be were the path to disparate impact claims an easier one.130
B. Unfair, Deceptive, or Abusive Acts or Practices
Under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(“Dodd-Frank” or the “Act”), the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
has the authority to adopt rules prohibiting lender use of UDAPs.131 While
the prohibition on such acts and practices may at first blush seem potentially
viable as grounds to challenge lenders’ discriminatory use of applicant
characteristics like education, the law does not grant the bureau unfettered
discretion to determine what practices are unfair, deceptive, or abusive. To
justify a conclusion that a lender practice is unfair, for example, the CFPB must
conclude that the “act or practice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury
to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers; and [that]
. . . such substantial injury is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to
126. Reva Siegel, Race Conscious but Race Neutral, 66 Ala. L. Rev. 653, 663 (2015).
127. Id. at 683.
128. 12 C.F.R. § 1002.6(a) (2019).
129. Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State
Action, 49 Stanford L. Rev. 1111, 1134 (1997).
130. If claims are too easily made, this could conceivably result in waste and a higher cost of
credit—although history is not replete with examples of such an effect of antidiscrimination
enforcement.
131.

12 U.S.C. § 5531(a) (2019).
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consumers or to competition.”132 In making this determination, the bureau may
not rely solely or primarily on considerations of public policy.133 Nonetheless,
the unfair practice definition may be most relevant for a challenge to a lender’s
use of complex criteria in assessing applicants for credit.
Dodd-Frank defines “abusive” practices as those involving inadequate or
deliberately misleading disclosure to consumers, but the term is not more
precisely defined than that.134 The bureau must find that a practice “materially
interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand a term or condition
of a consumer financial product or service” or takes advantage of applicants’
“lack of understanding . . . of the material risks, costs, or conditions of the
product or service; . . . the inability of the consumer to protect the interests
of the consumer in selecting or using a consumer financial product or service;
or . . . the reasonable reliance by the consumer on a covered person to act
in the interests of the consumer.”135 These conditions are unlikely to arise in
the context of lender use of nontraditional borrower criteria—in fact, lenders
are likely to trumpet their use of these criteria as a means for consumers to
access credit on more favorable terms than they otherwise would receive. The
bureau may not be able to curb use of nontraditional criteria using the UDAP
prohibition.136
When given an opportunity to limit a lender’s plan to use a broad variety
of applicant data in assessing whether to extend credit, the CFPB declined to
act,137 likely because the effect of the lender’s strategy was difficult to predict
ex ante. After all, use of different types of data might indeed result in less
expensive credit than some applicants might otherwise have received, especially
those applicants who had “thin” credit histories containing little information
of the sort typically relied upon by more traditional lenders. The company
that sought the “no-action” letter, Upstart Network Inc., an “online lending
132. 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c)(1)(A)-(B) (2019).
133. 12 U.S.C. §5531(c)(2) (2019).
134. Some industry observers have concluded that the CFPB has deliberately resisted precision to
retain flexibility in enforcement. See, e.g., Anand S. Raman, CFPB Defines ‘Unfair,’ ‘Deceptive’ and
‘Abusive’ Practices through Enforcement Activity, Skadden’s 2015 Insights—Financial Regulation
(Jan. 2015), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2015/01/cfpb-defines-unfairdeceptive-and-abusive-practice (noting that “[w]hile both Congress and industry groups
have called upon the bureau to clarify the scope and meaning of UDAP through its
rulemaking authority, the CFPB has declined to do so, choosing instead to rely upon its
enforcement authority and develop its UDAP doctrine on a case-by-case basis”).
135. 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d) (2019).
136. While the Act does not define the term, courts in other contexts have required an element of
intent when assessing conduct alleged to be deceptive. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445
U.S. 222, 232-33 (1980) (finding insider trading on basis of access to information obtained
without violation of a duty not fraudulent or deceptive within meaning of section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 because of the absence of intent to breach such a duty).
137.

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, No-Action Letter - Upstart Network, Inc. (Sept.
14, 2017), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201709_cfpb_upstart-no-actionletter.pdf.
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platform,” committed to share with the bureau the results of its monitoring of
lending for purposes of detecting disparate effects.138 The company disclosed
that it planned to pursue a strategy aimed at serving precisely this population
of potential borrowers with thin histories, and in Upstart’s application
to the CFPB, the firm outlined the variables that it would use in assessing
creditworthiness.139 In the application, the company indicated that it would
“complement[] . . . traditional underwriting signals with other variables that
are correlated with financial capacity and repayment propensity.” 140 The
variables to be considered included “educational information including, but
not limited to, the school attended and degree obtained, and [the applicant’s]
current employment….”141 Significantly, Upstart’s credit decisions are “based
on a mix of all the variables used in Upstart’s underwriting model, but they
also take into account combinations of these variables.”142 This highlights the
difficulty of teasing apart how sophisticated lenders’ models work. Consider
that a lender may base credit decisions on correlations between likelihood of
repayment and facially neutral applicant characteristics. Those correlations
would bolster the lender’s argument that basing credit decisions on the
selected borrower characteristics constituted a “business necessity” if the
lender were confronted with an ECOA challenge. The method of identifying
correlations—the algorithm—would likely be proprietary to the lender. Indeed,
if the lender relies on artificial intelligence for analysis, then the lender might
not even know either the process or the dispositive variables.
As part of its request to the CFPB, Upstart provided confidential information
suggesting that its “underwriting methodology has not produced a disparate
impact on protected classes in violation of ECOA or Regulation B.”143 The
company also proposed that it would monitor credit decision outcomes for
“specific applicant groups, including groups defined by race/ethnicity, sex,
age, income, credit history, educational background, and other non-credit
based variables.”144 The company pledged to work to market its products to
138. Request for a No-Action Letter - Upstart Network, Inc., at 1, 12, http://files.consumerfinance.
gov/f/documents/201709_cfpb_upstart-no-action-letter-request.pdf (last visited July 7,
2019).
139. Id. at 1 (“Upstart’s underwriting model has the ability to identify differences in risk between
‘thin File’ applicants.”).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 4.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 9. Such data collection is possible, notwithstanding Regulation B’s general prohibition
on collecting protected borrower characteristics. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
Federal regulations permit a lender to conduct a “self-test” to detect potential disparate
effects of lending practices. 12 C.F.R. § 1002.5(b)(1) (2019).
144. Request for a No-Action Letter - Upstart Network, Inc., at 14, http://files.consumerfinance.
gov/f/documents/201709_cfpb_upstart-no-action-letter-request.pdf (last visited July 7,
2019)
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consumers regardless of these characteristics, as well145; in an ideal world, the
results of its monitoring efforts would be made public. However, when the
chief executive of Upstart testified before Congress in the summer of 2019,
he did not offer detailed data on the demographics of the lender’s approved
applicants and rejected applicants.146 Opacity will, of course, get in the way of
any outsider analysis of potential disparate effects that might enable recourse
to the provisions of the ECOA.147 Those effects, the results of credit decisions,
matter most.
C. Fair Credit Reporting Act
Although lenders using nontraditional criteria by definition are drawing
on data from multiple sources other than or in addition to credit reporting
agencies, there is an argument that the Fair Credit Reporting Act (the
“FCRA”)148 should apply to them. The FCRA governs collection and provision
of consumer data for various purposes, including the extension of credit.149 Its
provisions apply to “consumer reports,” defined as “any written, oral, or other
communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency bearing
on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character,
145. Id.
146. In his testimony, Dave Girourard, the chief executive and co-founder of Upstart, told
lawmakers that the company had “demonstrated that our AI-driven model doesn’t result
in unlawful ‘disparate impact’ against protected classes of consumers,” and asserted
that “Upstart’s model provides higher approval rates and lower interest rates for every
traditionally underserved demographic.” Testimony of Dave Girouard before the Task Force
on Financial Technology, United States House Committee on Financial Services, July 25,
2019, at https://democrats-financialservices.house.gov/UploadedFiles/HHRG-116-BA00Wstate-GirouardD-20190725.pdf. More detail, beyond assertions about aggregate effects,
would have provided a better understanding of precisely how Upstart’s technology achieved
higher approval rates and lower interest rates, as well as what benchmark the company used
– explaining higher approval rates than what and lower interest rates than what. As some
critics have warned, artificial intelligence may approve applicants for credit who in the past
would have been denied, but charge them higher interest rates, and in the process replicate
racially disparate lending practies. See, e.g., Aryn Bussey, Educational Redlining? The use of education
data in underwriting could leave HBCU and MSI graduates in the dark, July 24, 2019, at https://
protectborrowers.org/educational-redlining/ (describing how stratification along lines of
race across educational institutions could lead to perpetuation of stratification along lines of
race in credit markets, if, for example, lenders accept more students and charge lower rates
to those attending the most selective institutions, because those institutions enroll fewer
people from historically excluded groups).
147. Although Upstart Network, Inc., pledged to “shar[e] the results of its fair lending and
access-to-credit test results with the Bureau,” id., the bureau may be barred from using that
information against the lender. 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-1(a) (2019).
148. 15 U.S.C. §1681 et seq. (2019).
149. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (2019) (“It is the purpose of this subchapter to require that consumer
reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for
consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other information in a manner which is fair and
equitable to the consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper
utilization of such information in accordance with the requirements of this subchapter”).
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general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living….”150 The scope
of the law is not limited to credit reporting agencies; the FCRA applies to
“any person which [sic], for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit
basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or
evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers
for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties.”151 This would
seem to encompass the sources that a lender applying nontraditional criteria to
applicants might use. The law prohibits some uses of consumer information,
barring creditors from using medical information in decisions to extend credit,
for example.152 It also imposes upon credit reporting agencies the obligation to
correct errors in the credit assessments they maintain when consumers notify
them.153 This approach is focused on accuracy of information, not outcomes
of lender decisions, and is in any event dependent on consumers to review
the data collected on them. The more variables lenders take into account, the
more daunting the task the consumer faces to ensure that all those variables are
accurate, let alone to identify consistent disparities in the terms or availability
of credit.154
If a greater variety of information on consumers is available from different
sources for use in credit decisions, the FCRA should apply to this wider pool
of providers of such information.155 However, some who have analyzed the use
of nontraditional criteria in lending decisions have warned that companies
providing “alternative credit-assessment tools” may evade the reach of the
FCRA by, for example, aggregating data at the household or neighborhood
level rather than using individual-level data.156 Some companies have argued
that they operate outside of the scope of the FCRA because they are not
consumer reporting agencies.157 Some critics of the limitations of the FCRA
have proposed legislation that would prohibit use of data that correlates with
prohibited characteristics, such as race.158 Taking that action would require
political will and would likely face industry objection. It would also raise
new challenges, because myriad data points that lenders use may correlate
150. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1) (2019).
151.

15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (2019).

152. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(g)(2) (2019). This suggests that other information could also be made offlimits in credit assessments were there the political will to do so.
153. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(f) (2019).
154. See Bruckner, supra note 62, at 55 (“To establish harm with an algorithmic credit report, a
consumer would have to review the thousands of data points used by the algorithmic lender
to identify an error….”).
155. Id at 50-51. While bank-affiliated lenders drawing on a constellation of nontraditional
data points might be subject to the FCRA, direct lenders that gather information about
applicants and use it themselves may not be. Id.
156. Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 72, at 184.
157.

Id. at 187.

158. Id. at 200 n.244.
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with race—there are so many available variables that the sheer number of
correlations is likely unmanageable. Innovation taking advantage of data
might be hampered.159 This is not to say that a blanket prohibition is a bad
idea; in fact, such a far-reaching change in credit decision-making might be
precisely what is necessary to correct disparities that have persisted for far too
long, and would be responsive to the critical perspectives discussed above.
In the absence of a prohibition, though, complete transparency in the credit
application assessment process would at least enable evaluation of the criteria
used by lenders, to enable identification of any troubling correlations with
prohibited applicant or borrower characteristics.
IV. Implications for Law Schools and their Students
Predicting the impact of widespread adoption of more complex and varied
lender analyses of applicants for credit, whether for student loans or consumer
loans after students complete (or cease) their studies, presents certain obvious
difficulties. First and foremost, lenders’ methods remain undisclosed: we do
not know how choice of major, choice of career, institution type, or any of
numerous other variables might be weighed in a credit decision. Second, we
lack data on the results of credit decisions by lenders using such nontraditional
criteria. As a result, this part does not offer predictions but sketches possibilities.
To the extent that lenders associate education-related variables with a greater
propensity to default, they may well penalize those who pursue particular
courses of study associated with lower earnings; who attend colleges, universities
and law schools associated with lower earnings or higher default rates; and
who manifest in ways visible to lenders the intention to pursue a career with
lower earning potential. This pattern would reinforce some preexisting and
longstanding forms of inequality among student borrowers and likely introduce
a few new ones. Young people who are already privileged disproportionately
attend the most elite colleges and universities,160 and presumably the most
elite law schools. Lenders that offer cheaper credit to students at, or who have
graduated from, those institutions will disproportionately reach students who
were already advantaged, reinforcing preexisting inequality along lines of
socioeconomic status, as well as race. For those who are less advantaged but
who manage to enroll at an elite institution, the benefits will be real. More
159. Chris Brummer and Yesha Yadav propose that regulators (and lawmakers) face inevitable
trade-offs when supervising financial services. Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav, Fintech and the
Innovation Trilemma, 107 Georgetown L. Rev. 235, 243 (2018), https://georgetownlawjournal.
org/articles/298/fintech-and-the-innovation-trilemma/pdf. Provision of clear rules and
maintenance of market integrity may come at the expense of innovation; facilitation of
innovation may come at the expense of clear rules. Id. at 264. While the authors do not focus
on the application of the FCRA or the ECOA, the analysis is relevant.
160. Gregor Aisch, Larry Buchanan, Amanda Cox & Kevin Quealy, Some Colleges Have More Students
From the Top 1 Percent Than the Bottom 60. Find Yours, N.Y. Times (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.
nytimes.com/interactive/2017/01/18/upshot/some-colleges-have-more-students-from-thetop-1-percent-than-the-bottom-60.html.
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frequently these students will enroll at institutions less favored by prospective
lenders.161
Turning to student loans, in particular, tying terms or availability to
perceived postgraduate earnings potential would disproportionately affect
law students interested in particular career paths, especially those in the public
interest. The wider spread of this lender tactic would increase the importance
of loan repayment assistance programs for newly minted lawyers. However, as
a practical matter there may be little that law schools can do to stop lenders
from continuing to expand the practice of taking into account a wide variety
of characteristics of their students or of the institution when they make credit
decisions. Some of the data that lenders may draw on must be disclosed, either
because the Education Department requires it or the American Bar Association
mandates it.
There is one concrete way law schools should prepare for this fast-changing
lending environment. To assist students effectively, law school financial aid
advisers should keep abreast of changes in evaluation methods by private
student loan providers, whose products many students may turn to after they
exhaust their federal borrowing options. To be able to advise students who may
lack financial sophistication, financial aid staff should try to educate students
about how loans are priced and steer them to lower-cost options. And of course,
the need for financial literacy training for student borrowers is that much
greater the more sophisticated lenders’ methods become. Students—indeed,
all consumers—must appreciate that comparison shopping will become ever
more important the more customized credit offerings become. Unfortunately,
there is not much evidence that financial literacy efforts work162; this may be an
area that is ripe for carefully designed intermediaries to help consumers.
There are broader, systemic implications for student lending if borrowers
offer private student loans on terms that are, at least at a given point in time,
more favorable than those of federal student loans. If these lenders’ assessments
are accurate, they will siphon off low-risk students from the federal loan system
and leave behind those student borrowers who are more likely to default. Law
students in particular are relatively low risk, at least as conventionally measured
using cohort default rates, and they also borrow larger amounts than do
undergraduate students.163 If such large, low-risk borrowers opt out of federal
student lending, they also reduce the amount by which federal aid programs
are revenue-positive.164 Currently, federal student lending takes in more than
161. Lenders have an incentive to offer students from the same institution the same or very similar
terms, because such generalized approach reduces the potential legal risk of individualized
assessment that could result in a disparate impact on the basis of race or another prohibited
characteristic.
162. See, e.g., Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 197, 210-11 (20082009) (finding that “researchers have not empirically validated financial-literacy education’s
effectiveness as a policy tool”).
163. Simkovic & McIntyre, supra note 38, at 275.
164. I use this term because technically, this is a “negative subsidy” rather than a “profit.” Glenn
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the government lends out, thanks to interest payments by borrowers,165 and
high-balance borrowers like law students pay more in interest. If lending to
students comes to appear more costly to the government and by extension to
taxpayers, federal student aid will become more politically vulnerable. Thus,
if sophisticated lenders are successful in identifying low-risk, high-balance
borrowers and luring them from federal loans, they threaten to undermine
federal programs both financially and politically.
Of course, there are also risks to borrowers of moving to nonfederal student
loans, even if initially the interest rates they face are lower. First, rates on private
loans typically fluctuate. Second, should the borrower encounter repayment
difficulty, the flexible repayment plans and the option of forbearance provided
by the Education Department will be unavailable. These differences matter
because, although the evidence suggests that law students tend to default
less often than undergraduates on their student loans, some law students do
experience considerable hardship in repayment and do default, and when they
do, the balance owed may be considerably larger.166
V. Conclusion
Increasingly sophisticated lenders are taking advantage of the mass of data
on consumers. Yet some of the data points correlate with characteristics of
potential borrowers that creditors are prohibited from using in making their
decisions about whom to lend to and on what terms. Lenders’ choices of
variables to use in assessing credit applicants may have a disparate impact
on people who belong to groups historically subordinated both in higher
education and in the market for consumer credit. This essay has outlined some
of the reasons that linking either student loan terms or the terms of credit more
generally to borrower educational characteristics, in particular, poses a threat
to the accessibility of higher education and undermines the promise that such
education functions as an engine of socioeconomic mobility. In the context
Kessler, Elizabeth Warren’s Claim that the U.S. Earns $51 Billion in Profits on Student Loans, Wash.
Post (July 11, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/elizabethwarrens-claim-that-the-us-earns-51-billion-in-profits-on-student-loans/2013/07/10/7769a3c2e9b8-11e2-aa9f-c03a72e2d342_blog.html?utm_term=.aa1d66af5230. In the public eye the
distinction is likely meaningless.
165. The point of this observation is not to suggest that federal student aid should “profit,” in the
words of critics, from extending credit to student borrowers dependent on loans to pursue
higher education. See, e.g., Letter to Arne Duncan, Sec. of Education, Feb. 25, 2015, http://
www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/2015_25_02_Letter_to_Secretary_Duncan_re_
Student_Loan_Profits.pdf (six members of the Senate criticized the “profit” earned by
the federal government on student lending and called for the Department of Education to
modify its policies to help indebted students). Rather, the point is larger: The federal role in
higher education finance will become more politically vulnerable the more it appears to cost.
166. The special obstacles student borrowers face in attempting to discharge education loans in
bankruptcy proceedings have been well-documented and are beyond the scope of this essay.
See Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal: Undue Hardship Discharge
Litigation, 83 Am. Bkrtcy. L.J. 179 (2009) (examining outcomes when student loan borrowers
sought to discharge obligations in bankruptcy proceedings).
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of legal education, such pricing of credit may disincentivize pursuit of the
very public service careers that both law schools and the profession seek to
promote, or—worse—punish those who pursue those careers with less favorable
loan terms.
Challenges to use of data on credit applicants’ educational backgrounds,
however, must overcome significant obstacles. The essay has briefly reviewed
the major federal laws that aim to protect consumers from discrimination on
the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, sex, or religion, in the provision
of credit, focusing primarily on the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. The
analysis above identified the reasons this and other applicable federal laws
may require creativity on the part of regulators seeking to challenge disparate
outcomes resulting from lenders’ use of education-related criteria in assessing
creditworthiness. Importantly, this essay has not explored possible state
action to target lender practices that have such effects, and this is a potentially
fruitful avenue for state regulators to explore. Evidence is difficult to obtain,
untangling credit evaluation methods will require enormous sophistication,
and lenders will present a strong defense of business necessity for whatever
practice they have adopted. The essay has argued for collection of more data
on lender decision-making and stronger regulatory responses to ever more
sophisticated lender methods. Failure to recognize and respond to the risks
these new methods pose will reinforce inequality along lines of race and
socioeconomic status. Conversely, securing equity of opportunity requires
vigilance and continuous reform.

